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constitute a minimally invasive search allowing the government to deviate from 












TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................... v
OPINION BELOW.............................................................................................................. 1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ................................................................................... I
STANDARD OF REVIEW.................................................................................................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................................................. 2
Statement of the Facts.............................................................................................. 2
Procedural History..................................................   4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT............................................................................................ 6
ARGUMENT......................................................................................................................... 7
I. THE CANINE SNIFF ON MR JARDINES’S FRONT PORCH CONSTITUTES
A SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.......................................... 7
A. The Police Conducted a Search Under the Jones Trespass Test When 
They Physically Invaded and Occupied the Curtilage of Mr. Jardines*s
Home............................................................................................................. 8
1. The front porch of Mr. Jardines’s home constitutes “curtilage,”
which is a constitutionally protected area........................................ 9
a. Under Dunn, an adjacent front porch set off by an archway
is inescapably curtilage........................................................ 9
b. The use of a drug detection canine at a front porch exceeds 
what a homeowner would reasonably expect a member of
the public to do while on the curtilage................................ 11
2. The police physically intruded onto the curtilage of Mr. Jardines’s
home, and therefore they conducted a search.................................. 13
B. The Canine Sniff of Mr. Jardines’s Home Constituted a Search Under the











1. Mr. Jardines manifested a subjective expectation of privacy within
his home, and therefore he satisfied the first prong of Katz...........  16
2. There is a reasonable expectation that the intimate activities
conducted in one’s home will not be subject to sense-enhancing
police tools........................................................................................ 16
a. Kyllo applies to drug detection canines because they are
sense-enhancing technology not in general public use....... 17
b. Canine sniffs detect both non-contraband and contraband 
items within the home, and thus intimate details regarding 
the interior of the home are revealed when a canine sniffs a
home..................................................................................... 18
c. This Court in Kyllo insisted that all details of the home are
sacrosanct and generally immune from police intrusion.... 21
11. THE CANINE SNIFF SEARCH WAS INVASIVE AND UNJUSTIFIED, AND 
THEREFORE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS THE APPROPRIATE 
EVIDENTIARY SHOWING REQUIRED TO INITIATE THE SEARCH..........  22
A. The Canine Sniff Search was Invasive Because it Physically Intruded 
into a Constitutionally Protected Area and Resulted in an Embarrassing
and Public Accusation of Criminal Conduct.............................................. 24
1. The sniff search physically intruded into the curtilage of the home 
in an embarrassing and stigmatizing marmer, and therefore cannot
be classified as minimally invasive.................................................. 24
a. The sniff search involved a physical intrusion into the
curtilage................................................................................ 24
b. The sniff search entailed a public accusation of criminal 
conduct that had the potential to embarrass and stigmatize
Mr. Jardines.......................................................................... 25
2. There is a heightened expectation of privacy in the home rendering
a search of the home more invasive................................................. 27
B. The Sniff Search of Mr. Jardines’s Home was not Justified bv a
Compelling Government Interest................................................................. 30
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1. The sniff search was not justified by a concern for the immediate
safety of police officers or the general public................................. 30
0 2. The sniff search was not justified by exigent circumstances
creating an immediate need for the search...................................... 32
3. The sniff search was not justified under the special needs doctrine. 33
C. Because the Lawfully Obtained Evidence was Insufficient to Establish 
^ Probable Cause for the Search Warrant, all Evidence Gathered Pursuant













U.S. Const, amend. IV ............................................................................................... 7, 22
Federal Statute
28U.S.C.§ 1257(a) (West 2011)............................................................................... 1
Cases
Supreme Court of the United States 
Almeicki-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266 (1973)........................................................................................ 28
Boyd V. United States,
116 U.S. 616(1886)........................................................................................ 9
California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207(1986)........................................................................................ 22,29
Camara v. Mun. Court of S. F.,
387 U.S. 523 (1967)........................................................................................ 23,26
Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583 (1974)........................................................................................ 28
Davis V. U.S.,
131 S.Ct. 2419(2011).................................................................................... 35
Dimaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200(1979)........................................................................................ 31
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders,
132 S.Ct. 1510(2012).................................................................................... 25
Florida v. J.L.,
529 U.S. 266 (2000)......................................................................................... 32
Illinois V. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405 (2005)......................................................................................... passim
Jones V. United States,
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)....................................................................................... passim
TABLE OF AU rHORlTIES (CONT.)
Page(sl
Katz V. United States^
389 U.S. 347 (1967)................................................. ...................................... 8, 15, 16,22
Kyllo V. United States,
533 U.S. 27 (2001)...................................................
Michigan v. Tyler,
436 U.S. 499 (1978)................................................. ...................................... 32
Mich. Dep 7 of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (2000).................................................
New Jersey V. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985).................................................
Oliver V. United States,
466 U.S. 170 (1984).................................................
Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690 (1996)................................................. .
Roaden v. Kentucky,
413 U.S. 496 (1973).................................................. ...................................... 32
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.,
489 U.S. 602 (1989)..................................................
Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968)......................................................
United States v. Dunn,
480 U.S. 294 (1987)..................................................
United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696 (1983)..................................................
Pale V. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30 (1970).....................................................
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646(1995)...................................................
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT.)
Page(s)
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967)........................................................................................ 33
Wilson V. Layne,
526 U.S. 603 (1999)........................................................................................ 29
Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U.S. 85 (1979).......................................................................................... 31
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
Hardesty v. Hamburg,
461 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2006).......................................................................... 14
Muhammed v. DBA, Asset Forfeiture Unit,
92 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1996)............................................................................ 21
United States v. $506,231,
125 F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 1997).......................................................................... 21
United States v. Acosta,
965 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1992).......................................................................... 10, 11
United States v. Depew,
8F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1993)............................................................................ 10
United States v. Edwards,
498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1973)............................................................................ 27, 28
United States v. Epperson,
454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).......................................................................... 27
United States v. French,
291 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2002).......................................................................... 12,25
United States v. Johnson,
256 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2000).......................................................................... 10
United States v. Jones,
239 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2001).......................................................................... 14
United States v. Kennedy,
131 F.3d 1371 (10th Cir. 1997) ..................................................................... 19
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT.)
Paficjs)
United States v. Limcires,
269 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2001).......................................................................... 19
United States v. Scarborough,
128 F.3d 1373 (10th Cir. 1997)...................................................................... 19
United States v. Titemore,
437 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2006)........................................................................... 12
United States v. Trayer,
898 F.2d 805 (D.C. Cir. 1990)........................................................................ 20
United States District Courts
United States v. Charles,
290 F. Supp. 2d610(D.V.I. 1999)................................................................. 12,13
Murphy v. Gardner,
413 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (D. Colo. 2006)........................................................... 12
State Supreme Courts 
Jacobson v. $55,900 in US. Currency,
728 N.W.2d 510 (Minn. 2007)........................................................................ 21
Jardines v. Florida,
73 So.3d 34 (Fla. 2011)................................................................................... passim
State V. Brisban,
809 So.2d 923 (La. 2002)............................................................................... 12
State V. Deary,
753 So.2d 200 (La. 2000)............................................................................... 11,12
State V. Morseman,
394 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1981)............................................................................... 34
State Appellate Courts
Horton v. United States,
541 A.2d 604 (D.C. 1988).............................................................................. 10,29
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT.)
Page(s)
State V. Jardines,
9 So.3d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 2008)......................................................... 1, 5, 6
State V. Rabb,
920 So.2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 2006).............................................. 5, 34, 35, 36
Foreign Jurisdiction
Entick V. Carrington,
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (CP. 1765)......................................................................... 8
Other Sources
Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics 
Detection Dog,
85 Ky. L.J. 405 (1996-1997)........................................................................... 20
Lewis R. Katz, Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection of the Fourth Amendment 
to Police Drug Dogs,
85 Neb. L. Rev. 735 (2007)............................................................................ 19,20,21
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment,
§ 2.2(g) (4th Ed. 2004).................................................................................... 30
Leslie Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable 
Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home,
88 Or. L. Rev. 829 (2010)............................................................................... 17, 18, 21
Richard E., Myers II, Detector Dogs and Probable Cause,
14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1 (2006).................................................................... 19
Robert C. Power, Changing Expectations of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment,
16 Widener L.J. 43 (2006).............................................................................. 28
Renee Swanson, Are We Safe at the Home From the Prying Dog Sniff?,
11 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L 131 (2009).................................................................... 18
IN THE







ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida is reported as Jardines v. Florida, 73 So.3d 
34 (Fla. 2011). The opinion of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, is reported 
as State v. Jardines, 9 So.3d 1 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 2008).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to review final judgments rendered by the Supreme Court of 
Florida on claims of Constitutional right upon granting a writ of certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) 
(West 2011). The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the Court of Appeal of Florida’s decision 
on April 14, 2011. This Court granted the writ of certiorari on January 6,2012. (J.A. 144.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
De novo review is applied to constitutional questions and questions of law regarding the 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,697-98 (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Facts
On November 3, 2006, an anonymous crime stoppers tip alleged that marijuana was 
being grown at Joelis Jardines’s home. (J.A. 16.) In response to the tip, both the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) and the Miami-Dade Police Department Narcotics Bureau 
conducted surveillance of Mr. Jardines’s home. (J.A. 8, 16.) Surveillance began at 7:00 a.m. on 
December 5,2006. (J.A. 8, 32.) Upon arriving at the home, Detective William Pedraja noticed 
that the blinds were closed and there were no vehicles in the driveway. (J.A. 8-9.) Detective 
Pedraja and the other agents observed Mr. Jardines’s home for a total of fifteen minutes before 
entering the property. (J.A. 32.)
At around 7:15 a.m., Detective Pedraja, accompanied by Detective Bartelt and his drug 
detection canine, stepped onto Mr. Jardines’s property and set up a perimeter. (J.A. 32, 109.) 
Detective Bartelt and his canine then proceeded towards the home to conduct the canine sniff. 
(J.A. 33.) During the approach, the canine was permitted to roam Mr. Jardines’s yard on a six- 
foot leash. (J.A. 49, 51-52.) Because his canine was “a little bit wild,” Detective Bartelt 
refrained from dropping the leash at any point during the sniff. (J.A. 52.) Later, Detective 
Bartelt testified that other canine handlers often drop the leash and allow the canine to roam.
(J.A. 52.) With Detective Bartelt in tow, the drug detection canine proceeded up the porch steps, 
through the archway and up to the front door. (J.A. 35, 49.) At no point during the surveillance
t
or sniff of the area did the officers seek pennission for the canine to be on Mr. Jardines’s front 
porch. (J.A. 35.)
Upon reaching the front door, the eanine alerted positively to the scent of narcotics. (J.A. 
P 53.) Detective Bartelt testified that he is alerted when “[he] observes out of normal behavior”
from the canine. (J.A. 50.) After registering the positive alert, Detective Bartelt notified 
Detective Pedraja and exited the porch. (J.A. 53.) Immediately thereafter, Detective Pedraja 
• approached the home and ascended through the archway towards the front door. (J.A. 36,45,
53.) Detective Pedraja proceeded to knock on the front door, but there was no answer. (J.A. 37.) 
Detective Pedraja later testified that he smelled the scent of live marijuana while standing at the 
door. (J.A. 36.)
Throughout his time in front of the house and on the porch. Detective Pedraja observed 
an air conditioner running continuously. (J.A. 37.) After knocking and receiving no answer, he 
remained on the property to observe the AC unit for fifteen to twenty minutes. (J.A. 37.)
Following the canine sniff. Detective Pedraja prepared and submitted an “Affidavit for 
^ Search Warrant” (J.A. 3.) In the affidavit, Detective Pedraja presented the court with the
evidence he used to reach the conclusion that marijuana was being cultivated in Mr. Jardines’s 
home. (J.A. 8-9.) Detective Pedraja cited the continuously running air conditioner, the 
^ anonymous crime stoppers tip, the closed blinds, the canine alert, and his own detection of
marijuana. (J.A. 8-9.) Detective Pedraja also included the qualifications of the canine. (J.A. 9- 
13.) The canine was trained to detect: marijuana, cocaine, heroin, hashish, methamphetamine,
^ and ecstasy. (J.A. 13.) Detective Pedraja noted the total number of detection sniffs the canine
had conducted, as well as the canine’s total positive alerts. (J.A. 13.) However, Detective
3
Pedraja did not provide the number of false positives or an accuracy rate for the canine. (J.A.
13.) The record is silent on the issue of the canine’s overall accuracy. (J.A. 13.)
Detective Pedraja acknowledged that grow houses typically use more electricity than 
other homes, and conceded that he never attempted to obtain Mr. Jardines’s electric bill. (J.A. 
41-43.) Further, he acknowledged that with a court order it would have been possible to obtain 
an electricity bill to determine power usage at Mr. Jardines’s home, and to make inquiries 
regarding the potential diversion of power from another source. (J.A. 42.) In addition, Detective 
Bartelt’s testimony that he did not smell marijuana while on the porch and instead detected only 
the scent of mothballs docs not support Detective Pedraja’s claims. (J.A. 16, 55.)
Ultimately, the court granted the warrant to search Mr. Jardines’s home for various items 
related to the “unlawful possession or distribution of controlled substances.” (J.A. 5, 110.) 
Members of the Miami-Datc Police Department Narcotics Bureau and DEA Agents executed the 
warrant and entered Mr. Jardines’s home through the frontdoor. (J.A. 17.) Upon entry they 
discovered that marijuana was being grown inside the residence. (J.A. 112.) Mr. Jardines was 
subsequently arrested. (J.A. 17, 112.)
Procedural History
On December 6, 2006, the State of Florida charged Joelis Jardines with one count of 
trafficking in cannabis and one count of grand theft in the third degree for stealing electricity. 
(J.A. 2.) Before trial, Mr. Jardines moved to suppress evidence and dismiss the charges, arguing 
that the canine sniff of his front door constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment and 
required an evidentiary showing of probable cause. (J.A. 16-17.) Because police failed to 
establish probable cause, the sniff search was illegal and could not support the issuance of a 
warrant to search Mr. Jardines’s home. (J.A. 19.)
0
A circuit judge sustained the motion and found the warrantless sniff search to be
0
“unreasonable and illegal.” (J.A. 134.) The scent evidence was excluded and the court 
concluded that the remaining evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause in support of 
0 the search warrant. (J.A. 135.)
The State of Florida appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida, and the 
ruling was reversed. State v. Jardines, 9 So.3d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 2008). The court held 
^ that the canine sniff was not a Fourth Amendment search and did not require a warrant. Id. at 6.
Because the canine sniff was lawful, the scent evidence was admitted and the warrant was 
upheld. Id. at 8, 10.
Following reversal, Mr. Jardines appealed, and the Supreme Court of Flonda granted 
review based on certified conflict with State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 
2006). Jardines v. State, 73 So.3d 34, 38-39 (Fla. 2011). On review, the Court considered two 
issues: “(i) whether a ‘sniff test’ by a drug detection dog conducted at the front door of a private 
residence is a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment and, if so, (ii) whether the evidentiary 
^ showing of wrongdoing that the government must make prior to conducting such a search is
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 36.
On the first issue, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the appellate court and held that 
^ a “sniff test” conducted at the front door of a home is a “substantial government intrusion ... and
constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Jardines, 73 So.3d at 36. 
The court recognized a heightened privacy expectation within the home and showed concern for 
^ arbitrary application of sniff searches. Id. at 45,49. The court noted that “safeguards” inherent
to the Fourth Amendment are in place to prevent just such an arbitrary intrusion. Id.
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On the second issue, the court held that “probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, is the 
proper evidentiary showing” required to initiate a canine sniff search at a private residence. 
Jardines, 73 So.3d. at 37. The Court reasoned that the evidentiary standard for a lawful search 
has only been reduced below probable cause when a search is shown to be minimally intrusive, 
and special government need or justification is present. Id. at 53-54.
Petitioner, State of Florida, filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted 
on January 6, 2012. (J.A. 144.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
When the police led their narcotics canine onto Mr. Jardines’s front porch and allowed 
the canine to sniff the home, they conducted a search under both the Jones Trespass Test and the 
Katz Two-Pronged Test. Because the canine physically invaded and occupied a constitutionally 
protected area in order to obtain information about the interior of the home, the canine sniff was 
a search under the Jones Test. Both the subjective and objective expectation of privacy prongs 
were met under the Katz test, rendering the police conduct a search. Mr. Jardines had the 
requisite subjective expectation of privacy that the smells within his home would not be subject 
to sense-enhancing police technology and that his porch would remain free from investigative 
searches. And, under Kyllo, Mr. Jardines satisfied the objective prong of Katz because the police 
used a sense-enhancing technology not available to the general public in order to obtain 
information about the interior of the home that would otherwise not be available without physical 
intrusion.
Because the canine sniff of Mr. Jardines’s home was a search, the invasive nature and 
lack of justification rendered it illegal without a showing of probable cause by the government. 
This Court has only deviated fi'om a probable cause standard when a Fourth Amendment search
0
^ is minimally invasive and supported by a compelling governmental justitication. Here, the
search was invasive and unjustified. The police physically invaded the curtilage of Mr. 
Jardines’s home when they led their canine on to the porch for investigative purposes. The 
0 invasion had the potential to frighten, embarrass and stigmatize Mr. Jardines. Per the Katz
analysis, the reasonable expectation of privacy is strongest in the home. An invasive search is 
rendered more egregious in the context of a heightened privacy expectation. Further, the 
^ government had no justification for the warrantless search. The government agents at the scene
were not in immediate danger. The search was not justified by an emergency or exigent 
circumstance that could lead to the immediate loss of evidence. And, the government had no 
special need to initiate a warrantless search beyond the normal needs of law enforcement. 
Therefore, the canine sniff search of Mr. Jardines’s home was illegal, and illegally gathered 
evidence cannot be the basis for a warrant. After exclusion of the illegal evidence, the remaining
0
lawfully gathered evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause. Because the warrant 
was not supported by probable cause, the Supreme Court of Florida correctly ruled to suppress 
0 all evidence gathered pursuant to the execution of the warrant at Mr. Jardines’s home.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CANINE SNIFF ON MR. JARDINES’S FRONT PORCH CONSTITUTES A 
SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
0
The Fourth Amendment ensures “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches ...U.S. Const, amend. IV.
^ (emphasis added). \n Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012), this Court
recognized two distinct tests for determining whether particular government conduct constitutes 
a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. The first test is the traditional, common law “Trespass 









361-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concumng), “reasonable expectation of privacy test.” Jones^ 132 S. 
Ct. at 950. The canine sniff of Mr. Jardincs’s porch and front door was a search under both tests.
A. The Police Conducted a Search Under the Jones Trespass Test When They
Physically Invaded and Occupied the Curtilage of Mr. Jardines’s Home.
The police illegally searched Mr. Jardines’s home when they physically invaded his 
porch with a drug detection canine. In Jones, this Court concluded that when the “Government 
physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining information ... such a 
physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. In analyzing the physical intrusion, 
this Court utilized a trespass analysis. However, it is important to note that a proper “trespass” 
analysis does not apply “18th century tort law,” but instead applies 18th century guarantees 
against unreasonable searches. Id. at 953. This Court explained the 18th century understanding 
of property rights, quoting Lord Camden, who stated, “our law holds the property of every man 
so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbor’s close without his leave.” Id. at 949 
(quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (C.P. 1765)). Therefore, the correct 
trespass standard to apply in a Jones analysis is the historical standard utilized by this Court.
In Jones, the police attached a small GPS tracking device to a car and monitored its 
movements for twenty-eight days without a warrant. 132 S. Ct, at 948-49. This Court concluded 
that the installation of the GPS device and the subsequent monitoring of the vehicle constituted a 
search because the police physically occupied a constitutionally protected area. Id. at 949. Here, 
because the police physically invaded and occupied a constitutionally protected area of Mr. 
Jardines’s home in order to unlawfully obtain evidence, the canine sniff constituted a search.
0
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a. Under Dunn, an adjacent front porch set off by an archway is 
inescapably curtilage.
Mr. Jardines’s porch and front door are within the curtilage of his home and are therefore 
in a constitutionally protected area. In Jones, this Court noted that “the curtilage of a home” is 
one of the areas protected under the Fourth Amendment. 132 S. Ct. at 953. Curtilage is defined 
as “the area to which extends the intimate activities associated with the ‘sanctity of a man's home 
and the privacies of life.’” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1983) (quoting Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). As such, the curtilage is “considered par/ of the home 
itself (or Fourth Amendment purposes.” Id. (emphasis added).
In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1995), this Court clarified its definition of 
curtilage, elaborating on its earlier Oliver definition. This Court articulated four factors that can 
be used to determine whether a particular area is part of the curtilage and thus entitled to the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The factors are: (1) the proximity of the area to the 
home, (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, (3) the nature 
of the uses to which the area is put, and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area 
from observation by people passing by. Id. The Court emphasized they “[were] not suggest[ing] 
that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, 
yields a ‘correct’ answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions.” Id. Rather, the four factors are 
tools designed to answer the central question of “whether the area in question is so intimately 
tied to the home itself’ that it should be afforded the same constitutional protection as the home 
under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
The Third Circuit applied the Dunn test and acknowledged that there are differences in a 
Dunn analysis when the residence in question is in an urban area, as opposed to rural area.
9
United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1256-57 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that the factors of Dimn 
are less relevant in a city and especially in an apartment complex). The court noted, “although 
the Dunn factors also apply to determine extent-of-curtilage questions in urban areas, certain 
factors may be less determinative in a city because of the physical differences in the properties.” 
Id. at 1256. In Horton v. United States, 541 A.2d 604, 608-09 (D.C. 1988), the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals also recognized the difficulty in applying the four-factor Dimn 
analysis to a dwelling in an urban area. In Horton, the court suggested that “the absence of a 
fence or other means of excluding passersby from the area may be less significant” when the 
home is in an urban area. Id. The court reasoned that the physical realities of city streets and 
houses “may make it impossible, or at least impracticable, to screen one’s home and yard from 
view.” Id. at 608. When the curtilage factors are applied to this case, it is clear that Mr. 
Jardines’s front porch is curtilage.
In this case, the two most relevant factors that establish the front porch as curtilage are 
the proximity of the area to the home and whether the area was within an enclosure. For 
proximity, courts have generally recognized that there is no “fixed distance at which curtilage 
ends.” United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. 
Depew, 8 F.3d 1424, 1427 (9th Cir. 1993)). Instead, the proximity factor must be analyzed case- 
by-case. Id. at 902 (citing Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301). As for the presence of an enclosure, this 
Court’s analysis in Dunn turned on whether a physical structure “demark[s] a specific area of 
land ... that is readily identifiable as part and parcel of the house.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302.
Here, the first factor weighs heavily in Mr. Jardines’s favor. Mr. Jardines’s front porch 
actually abuts the house itself, and therefore it is physically impossible for the area to be any 













intimately connected to the home itself. The record is silent as to whether there was any physical 
structure completely enclosing the front yard of the home. The record does establish, however, 
the existence of an archway at the top of the stairs leading up to the porch. (J.A. 49.) The drug 
detection canine was allowed to roam in front of the police, ascend the stairs, and cross the 
threshold of the archway so that he was physically occupying the front porch. (J.A. 49.) An 
archway is not merely a decoration, but a physical structure that announces to a guest that they 
have arrived at the home. The archway on Mr. Jardines’s porch sets a bright line demarking a 
specific area that is to be included within the home.
The four factors oiDunn do not constitute a “finely tuned formula.” 480 U.S. at 301. As 
the Third Circuit noted in Acosta, some factors are less determinative outside the rural context. 
Even in the absence of information on whether the yard is enclosed by a fence, the proximity of 
the porch to the home and the presence of an archway together are sufficient to provide notice to 
any person approaching the home that they are in an area “so intimately tied to the home itself 
that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Dunn, 
480 U.S. at 301. Therefore, the strength of the first two factors establishes that the front porch 
was curtilage.
b. The use of a drug detection canine at a front porch exceeds what a 
homeowner would reasonably expect a member of the public to do 
while on the curtilage.
Courts have reached different conclusions about the proper characterization of a front 
porch. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the front porch is part of the curtilage, but 
that the level of protection afforded the porch is less than that afforded other parts of the 
curtilage. State v. Deary, 753 So.2d 200, 201-02 (La. 2000); see also State v. Brisban, 809 So.2d 
923, 928 (La. 2002) (holding that a front porch is curtilage). In Deary, the police approached the 
front door to question the owner of the home. 753 So.2d at 201. The court concluded that there
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was no constitutional violation because attempting to talk to the owner of a home in an area open 
to the public is a legitimate police activity. Dreary, 753 So.2d at 202. In distinguishable 
contexts some courts have held that areas open to the public near the home, such as porches, are 
not included in the curtilage at all. See United States v. Titemore, 437 F.3d 251, 259-60 (2d Cir. 
2006) (holding that the porch and side yard were not part of the curtilage because there was no 
reasonable expectation that those areas would remain private from visitors, including officers); 
Murphy v. Gardner, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1156,1167-68 (D. Colo. 2006) (applying Dunn and 
concluding that an area where the “pizza deliverer” could go refutes any claim “of the sanctity to 
the space”).
Most of the “areas open to the public” and front porch cases turn on whether there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area in question. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
United States v. French, 291 F.3d 945, 953-55 (7th Cir. 2002), demonstrates how an officer’s 
actions in these areas can affect a curtilage analysis. In French, the court concluded that a gravel 
driveway was not curtilage because members of the public had access to it. Id. at 952-54. 
However, the court noted that this was not a case where there was “an overzealous officer” 
attempting to search by “ransack[ing] every nook and cranny of [the] yard.” Id. at 954. The 
court acknowledged that the police came to the property “for the express purpose of locating an 
errant probationer” and not to “conduct a search.” Id. The French court suggested that its 
ultimate conclusion might have been different had the activities of the officers not been those 
that could reasonably be expected to be conducted on a gravel driveway. Id. at 954-55.
In contrast to the police in French, the police in United States v. Charles, 290 F. Supp. 2d 
610, 614 (D.V.I. 1999), affd, 29 Fed. Appx. 892 (3d Cir. 2002), approached the front door of a 











approached the house to swab the doorknob of the front door in order to detennine whether 
marijuana residue was present. Charles^ 290 F. Supp. at 614. The court concluded that the 
doorknob was part of the curtilage and that the doorknob swab was a Fourth Amendment 
violation. Id.
Here, the officers were not merely walking around areas where ordinary members of the 
public might go, but were instead employing intrusive investigative techniques in order to obtain 
information not obtainable with ordinary senses. One might reasonably expect a member of the 
general public to approach the front door of a person’s house and knock. However, what is 
reasonable once a member of the public is at the front door does not extend to all activity. Like 
the swab in Charles, the canine sniff on Mr. Jardines’s porch was unlawful, and it can be seen in 
stark contrast to police officers entering the porch for the reasonable purpose of contacting the 
resident. Because the police were engaging in activities that ordinary members of the public 
could not reasonably be expected to do, this Court should follow the analysis of Charles and 
hold that the front porch of Mr. Jardines’s home is curtilage.
2. The police physically intruded onto the curtilage of Mr. Jardines’s home, 
and therefore they conducted a search.
The police and their drug detection canine physically intruded and occupied Mr. 
Jardines’s constitutionally protected front porch. In Jones, this Court concluded that a small 
GPS device attached to the undercarriage of a car constituted a physical intrusion, triggering 
Fourth Amendment protection. 132 S. Ct. at 949. Essential to this Court’s analysis in Jones was 
the government’s encroachment onto a protected area. Id. at 952. The Court noted that by 
physically invading the car, “the officers ... did more than conduct a visual inspection.” /d. 
(emphasis in original).
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Ill contrast to Jones, there are some legitimate reasons for an officer to approach the 
curtilage of a person’s home that would not result in a constitutional violation. For example, an 
officer may approach the front door to conduct a “knock and talk.” A “knock and talk” is an 
investigative procedure whereby an officer approaches the front door of a home to ask the 
resident questions and observe the surroundings with his or her plain senses. United States v. 
Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Federal courts have recognized the ‘knock and talk’ 
strategy as a reasonable investigative tool.”). Various courts have held the “knock and talk” 
practice constitutional. See Hardesty v. Hamburg, 461 F.3d 646,654 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that officers are permitted to enter private property when they are attempting to ask the 
homeowner questions, and can proceed to the back of the house after not receiving an answer at 
the front door) (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the canine sniff was equivalent to the physical intrusion in Jones, and as such, 
constituted a search. None of the legitimate reasons that would allow the officers to go to the 
front door of the home were present. The officers were not approaching the front door of Mr. 
Jardines’s home to seek consent to search the home. This was not a simple “knock and talk” 
where the officer’s primary intention was to ask Mr. Jardines questions. Instead, the sole 
purpose for the officers’ presence was to conduct a well-orchestrated investigatory procedure 
that occurred on Mr. Jardines’s front yard and porch. The police allowed their drug detection 
canine to roam Mr. Jardines’s property and occupy the front porch in hopes of detecting 
contraband. Only after the drug detection canine gave a positive alert did the police decide to 
knock on the front door. This demonstrates that the intent of the officers was not to speak with 
Mr. Jardines but was instead to conduct their investigation. Because the police were not on Mr.
Jardines’s porch to conduct any lawful police procedures, their actions constituted a physical 
intrusion and occupation of Mr. Jardines’s constitutionally protected curtilage.
The police conducted a search under the Trespass Test because the front porch is a 
constitutionally protected area, and the police physically invaded and occupied the porch to 
obtain information about the interior of the home.
B. The Canine Sniff of Mr. Jardines’s Home Constituted a Search Under the Katz
Two-Pronged Test.
Because no member of the public reasonably expects that an officer and a trained drug 
detection canine will be allowed to wander freely around his home and obtain information about 
the smells within, without a warrant, the conduct of the officers in this case was a search under 
the Katz Test. In Jones^ this Court acknowledged that both the Trespass Test and the Katz Test 
could be used to determine whether certain police conduct constituted a search, noting, “the Katz 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law 
trespassory test.” 132 S. Ct. at 951 (emphasis added). "'Katz did not narrow the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope.” Id.
In Katz V. United States, this Court articulated a two-part test to determine whether 
particular government conduct constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 389 U.S. at 
361 (Harlan, J., concurring). First, a person must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy.” Id. at 361. Second, “the expectation [must] be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id. Mr. Jardines manifested the requisite subjective 
expectation that the smells within the interior of his home would remain private, and that 
expectation is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Therefore, the canine sniff 






1. Mr. Jardines manifested a subjective expectation of privacy within his 
home, and therefore he satisfied the first prong QiKatz.
Mr. Jardines maintained a subjective expectation of privacy while he was in his own 
home. In Katz, the FBI attached a listening and recording device to the outside of a telephone 
booth in order to monitor phone calls placed by Katz inside the booth. 389 U.S. at 348. This 
Court concluded that by shutting the phone booth door and paying a toll, Katz was “entitled to 
assume that the words he utters .. . [would] not be broadcast to the world.” Id. at 352.
Similarly, when Mr. Jardines closed his blinds and the front door to his home, he 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. None of his activities were visible to the public 
from the exterior of the home. A person reasonably expects to be able to retreat into the interior 
of his or her home and keep the activities within private. Like the phone booth in Katz, the home 
is a place that one expects to be private.
2. There is a reasonable expectation that the intimate activities conducted in 
one’s home will not be subject to sense-enhancing police tools.
Sending a drug detection canine to a person’s door to detect the smells within the home is 
per se unreasonable. Kyllo provides the analytical framework to determine whether police use of 
sense-enhancing technology at the home constitutes a search. 533 U.S. at 34. In Kyllo, agents 
used a thermal imaging detector to scan Kyllo’s home to detect the level of heat that was 
emanating from within. Id. at 29-30. The scan was performed Ifom across the street and only 
showed that the roof and a sidewall were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home. Id. at 
30. In Kyllo, this Court held that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information 
regarding the interior of the home that could otherwise not have been obtained without physical 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a search,” where “the technology in 
question is not in general public use.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This Court ultimately 







narcotics canine to sniff Mr. Jardines’s front porch and door, like the use of a thermal imager, is 
a search.
a. Kyllo applies to drug detection canines because they are sense­
enhancing technology not in general public use.
A narcotics detecting canine is a sense-enhancing technology. Central to this Court’s 
analysis in Kyllo was the fear that ever-advancing technology would further erode the Fourth 
Amendment rights of citizens. 533 U.S. at 35. In the context of thermal imagers, this Court 
reasoned that the distinction between “off-the-wall” and “through-the-wall” sense enhancing 
observation would become meaningless as technology advances and devices continue to merely 
detect “off-the-wall” heat, but can see more details within the home. Id. at 35 n.3.
While a drug detection canine is not identical to the thermal imaging device in Kyllo, it 
maintains the characteristics of “technology.” Drug detection canines are a form of technology 
because they “receive careful training using teclinical processes, methods, or knowledge, and are 
the subject of scientific study that is intended to enhance their capabilities.” Leslie Lunney, Has 
the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to 
Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 Or. L. Rev. 829, 894-95 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). The 
use of narcotics canines allows officers to enhance human senses in a way nearly identical to 
more traditional forms of technology, such as a thermal imager. Furthermore, the federal 
government has characterized canine narcotics units as “Non-Intrusive Technology." See id. at 
893-94 (citing White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy,
WWW.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/ctac/ctac02/blueprint2002.pdf) (emphasis added).
Similar to the thermal imagers, canine technology is not static. The continued 
development of new and ever advancing training techniques and genetic engineering open the 





For example, Russia has created a new breed of “super sniffer” canines by crossbreeding huskies 
and jackals. Lunney, 88 Or. L. Rev. at 895 n.312. The rapid pace of increasingly sophisticated 
technology makes it impossible to conclude that canine technology will not advance. Because 
canine technology can and has advanced, the thermal imager in Kyllo is analogous to a trained 
drug detection canine.
Highly trained drug detection canine technology is not in the general public use. Renee 
Swanson, Are We Safe at the Home From the Prying Dog Sniff?, 11 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L 131, 134 
(2009) (examining canine sniffs through the Kyllo framework). In Kyllo, this Court held that 
thermal imaging devices were not in the general public use, even though hundreds were available 
to rent and thousands had been produced. 533 U.S. at 39 n.6, 47 n.5. In Kyllo, this Court 
associated “general public use” with “routine.” Id. at 39 n.6. This Court did not articulate a 
specific number of thermal imagers that would need to be used by the public to classify the 
technology as “in the general public use.” Id. at 39. Drug detection canines are specialized 
sensory-enhancing tools that must be distinguished from ordinary pets. Therefore, drug 
detection canines are sense-enhancing technology not in general public use, and Kyllo is 
applicable to canine sniffs.
b. Canine sniffs detect both non-contraband and contraband items
within the home, and thus intimate details regarding the interior of 
the home are revealed when a canine sniffs a home.
Because canines alert to non-contraband items and can give false positive alerts, canines 
can reveal information about the intimate details of an individual’s home. Justice Souter’s 
dissent in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting), noted that “[t]he 
infallible dog ... is a creature of legal fiction.” Society’s increased understanding about the 
science of canine sniffs suggests that previous assumptions and understandings about the nature 
of canine sniffs were incomplete. “What we have learned about the fallibility of dogs in the
m
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years since Place was decided would itself be reason to call for reconsidering Place's decision 
against treating the intentional use of a trained dog as a search.” Caballes^ 543 U.S. at 410 
(Souter, J., dissenting). The practical effect of a canine “false positive” is to expose the entire 
home, including non-contraband items, to the police. Therefore, evaluating the accuracy of 
canine sniff searches is essential in order to determine the extent of a home’s exposure to the 
police.
Courts have acknowledged that narcotics canines can and do make mistakes while 
conducting narcotics sniffs. See, e.g.. United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 (10th Cir. 
1997) (acknowledging that the evidence demonstrated that a particular canine had a 71% 
accuracy rate); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.3 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(describing a canine that had a 92% success rate over its career); United States v. Limares, 269 
F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing a canine that had an accuracy rate of 62%, with the 
other 31% of the alerts being signaled to the presence of currency). Inaccurate canine alerts can 
either be caused by the unreliability and lack of training of a particular canine or by handler 
error. Lewis R. Katz, Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection of the Fourth Amendment to 
Police Drug Dogs, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 735, 757-65 (2007).
While the intent of a handler officer will not, in most instances, be malicious, it is 
possible for a handler to cause a false positive. Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and 
Probable Cause, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 5 (2006). These handler errors are often referred to 
as “cuing,” and they can be either unintentional or intentional. Id. When a handler cues to his 
narcotics canine that he believes narcotics are present, he is influencing the objectivity of the 
canine performing the sniff. Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of 





changes in voice inflection or by physical signs. Bird, 85 Ky. L.J. at 424. One example of a 
physical cue is when a handler believes drugs may be present in a particular location and, as a 
result, leaves the canine in that area longer than other areas. Katz, 85 Neb. L. Rev. at 763. In 
that scenario, the canine may want to please the handler and may alert in the absence of 
contraband. Id. at 763. In addition to cuing, a handler might also misread a canine’s reaction 
during the sniff and erroneously conclude that there was a positive alert. Bird, 85 Ky. L.J. at 
423. Courts have acknowledged the problematic influence non-neutral procedures can have on 
the accuracy of canine sniffs. See United States v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(“But we are mindful that less than scrupulously neutral procedures [of the handler], which 
create at least the possibility of unconscious ‘cuing’, may well jeopardize the reliability of dog 
sniffs.”).
The potential for handler cuing and handler misreads weighs heavily against the 
conclusion that a canine sniff reveals no information other than the location of a substance that 
no one has a right to possess. If a narcotics canine gives a false positive alert the practical result 
will be to expose the entire home to the visual observation by the police, which is extremely 
intrusive. In this case the only evidence the police had of any wrongdoing was the anonymous 
tip, the closed blinds, and the continuously running air conditioner. The officers relied on the 
positive alert by the narcotics canine to obtain a warrant and enter the home. If a false positive 
serves as the basis for obtaining a warrant, the entire home is put at risk of expansive police 
intrusion.
In addition to false alerts, canines may alert to non-contraband items that contain the 
same materials as contraband. For example, the chemical in heroin that a canine alerts to is 






Rev. at 755. The chemical in cocaine that the canine alerts to is methyl benzoate, which can be 
legally found in perfumes and other household products. Katz, 85 Neb. L. Rev. at 755-56; 
Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 534-535 (Minn. 2007) (Hanson, J., 
concurring); see also Lunney, 88 Or. L. Rev. at 838-39 (discussing non-contraband detection by 
canines). Further, a significant portion of this country’s currency is contaminated with drug 
residue, making it possible for a canine to alert to the presence of currency. United States v. 
$506,23!, 125 F.3d 442, 453 (7th Cir. 1997) (the court recognized that “no one can place much 
stock in the results of dog sniffs because at least one-third of the currency in the United States is 
contaminated with cocaine in any event”); Muhammed v. DEA, Asset Forfeiture Unit, 92 F.3d 
648, 653 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that an extremely high percentage of currency is contaminated 
with drug residue).
Because drug detection canines can alert to perfumes, cleaning chemicals, and other 
items in which a person can have a legitimate expectation of privacy, a drug detection canine is 
analogous to the thermal imaging technology used in Kyl/o. That is, the thermal imager in Ky/h 
only detected heat and required the police to make an inference regarding the activities occumng 
\vithin the home. Similarly, a drug detection canine, which detects both contraband and non­
contraband items, requires the police to make an inference about the subject of the alert within 
the home.
c. This Court in Eyl/o insisted that all details of the home are 
sacrosanct and generally immune from police intrusion.
Even if this Court presumes that drug detection canines detect only contraband, such a 
conclusion is irrelevant when the inspection takes place in the home. In other contexts, this 
Court has held that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband. See, e.g., 
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10 (concluding a canine sniff of a defendant’s car only detects
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contraband and there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband); United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (canine sniffs only reveal “the presence or absence of 
narcotics”). In Kyllo, this Court made it clear that all details of the home were “intimate details.” 
533 U.S. at 37-38. In reaching this conclusion, the actual “quality and quantity” of the 
information gained from within the home was not relevant. Id. at 37. No exception was made 
permitting searches of the home when those searches only resulted in the seizure of contraband. 
Id. at 36-40. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment would provide little protection if the seizure of 
contraband always justified intrusions into the sanctity of the home. Instead, this Court 
concluded that, “the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance of the house.” Id. at 40 
(internal quotations omitted). There is a bright-line rule that distinguishes the home from all 
other areas. Id.
II. THE CANINE SNIFF SEARCH OF MR. JARDINES’S HOME WAS INVASIVE AND
UNJUSTIFIED, AND THEREFORE PROBABLE CAUSE IS THE APPROPRIATE
EVIDENTIARY SHOWING REQUIRED TO INITIATE THE SEARCH.
Under Katz, as set forth above, the reasonableness of a search is determined through a 
“twofold requirement.” 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). “[F]irst, has the individual 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is 
society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
211 (1986) (summarizing the Katz test). If the Katz requirements are met, a search is 
“unreasonable” unless supported by a government showing of probable cause. U.S. Const, 
amend. IV.
Despite the utility of Katz, the Court has not set forth a definitive test establishing when 
deviations from the probable cause standard are appropriate. Rather, this Court has carefully 
weighed government interests against privacy interests to selectively allow warrantless searches 
when appropriate. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 29-30 (1968) (holding that, absent
probable cause, police officers are permitted to pat down a suspect’s outer clothing in search of 
weapons to ensure the immediate safety of the officers); New Jersey v. T.L.O.^ 469 U.S. 325,
341 -42 (1985) (holding that probable cause is not required for a school principle to initiate the 
search of a student reasonably suspected of violating the law). In judging a given search, this 
Court has weighed the “nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment 
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” 
Place, 462 U.S. at 703; see also Camara v. Mtm, Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) 
(noting that reasonableness in the absence of probable cause can be determined by “balancing the 
[government’s] need to search against the invasion which the search entails”). Only when the 
invasiveness is minimal, the privacy expectation is weak, and legitimate governmental 
justification exists, has this Court found firm ground to sustain a deviation from probable cause.
In contrast, the warrantless sniff search of Mr. Jardines’s home lacks a stable foundation. 
The sniff search took place on Mr. Jardines’s front porch, physically invading the curtilage of his 
home, and potentially drawing unwarranted attention and stigma from the surrounding 
neighborhood. (J.A. 49-50.) Because the home stands at “the very core of the Fourth 
Amendment,” the invasiveness of the search is enhanced. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (internal 
quotations omitted). Further, legitimate government justifications for initiating the search were 
non-existent Cf. e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (search justified by immediate safety of police and 
civilians); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs., 489 U.S. 602,630 (1989) (safety of general public on 
trains); Mich. Dep 7 of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (2000) (public safety on highways). 
The Supreme Court of Florida correctly held that a showing of probable cause was required to 





A. The Sniff Search was Invasive because it Physically Intruded into a
Constiliitionallv Protected Area and Resulted in an EmbaiTassing and Public
Accusation of Criminal Conduct.
The sniff search constituted a substantial invasion upon Mr. Jardines’s legitimate privacy 
expectation within his home. First, the sniff search physically intruded into the curtilage of the 
home and was dramatically conducted in public view of the sunouiiding neighborhood. (J.A. 
49-50.) Second, the intrusion is rendered more egregious in light of the home’s preeminent 
standing under this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (noting 
the home stands at the “core of the Fourth Amendment”).
1. The sniff search physically intruded into the curtilage of the home in an 
embarrassing and stigmatizing manner, and therefore, cannot be classified 
as minimally invasive.
a. The sniff search involved a physical intrusion into the curtilage.
In narrow exceptions contrasting sharply to the facts here, this Court has authorized 
warrantless searches when the search procedures were minimally invasive. See Terry^ 392 U.S. 
at 29-30 (search limited to exterior of clothing); Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (exterior of luggage). In 
Terry, this Court held that police officers are permitted to conduct a warrantless “pat down” 
search of an individual suspected of carrying a weapon and conducting criminal activity. 392 
U.S. at 30. This Court found that the warrantless pat down was lawful because it was limited to 
the suspect’s outer clothing and confined in scope to locating weapons. Id. at 21, 29-30 (noting 
the officer “never did invade [the defendant’s] person beyond the outer surfaces of his clothes” 
and refrained from conducting a “general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal 
activity he might find”). Similarly, in Place, this Court authorized the warrantless sniff search of 
luggage in an airport in part because the search was limited to the exterior of the effect. 462 U.S. 
at 707. Like in Terry, the search was found to be minimally invasive because government 







Ill contrast, the search here invaded the curtilage and extended inside the outer boundaries 
of Mr. Jardines’s home, and therefore, cannot be described as minimally invasive. See Oliver, 
466 U.S. at 180 (finding the curtilage is “considered part of [the] home itself for Fourth 
Amendment purposes”). Detective Bartelt ushered the drug detection canine up the porch steps 
and through the archway based on nothing more than a stale anonymous tip. (J.A. 49.) The 
canine did not begin bracketing or registering the scent until after entering the curtilage, and the 
detectives did not attempt to use their own senses of smell until after the canine registered a 
positive alert. (J.A. 49, 58.) In sum, the government possessed no legitimate evidence of 
marijuana before the canine invaded the curtilage. The entire event was by its very nature an 
unlawful search for evidence inside a constitutionally protected area. Cf. French, 291 F.3d, 953- 
55 (finding officers were lawfully present on curtilage because they approached for the 
legitimate purpose of locating a probationer and refrained from conducting a search). Because 
the search was conducted entirely inside the curtilage, the minimally invasive standard set forth 
in Terry and Place is inapplicable to the facts here.
b. The sniff search entailed a public accusation of criminal conduct 
that had the potential to embarrass and stigmatize Mr. Jardines.
In addition to considering the physical intrusiveness of a search, this Court has measured 
invasiveness by evaluating the anonymity afforded to the suspect and the potential for 
embarrassment. In Terry, this Court weighed the “frightening, and perhaps humiliating 
experience” of undergoing a search and found that context was key in affording a suspect 
sufficient anonymity. 392 U.S at 25. In Place, this Court found “embarrassment and 
inconvenience” to be problematic traits of “more intrusive investigative methods.” 462 U.S. at 
707. And in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring), this Court weighed the “humiliating and deeply offensive” experience of being
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stripped searched against the need to maintain security within a correctional facility. In each 
case, the potential for humiliation and embarrassment increased the invasiveness of the search.
Here, the sniff search of Mr. Jardines’s home was embarrassing and stigmatizing. The 
scene involved a “wild” dog accompanied by at least five government officials and culminated in 
a “dramatic[]” search readily visible to the surrounding neighborhood. (J.A. 52, 109,49.) 
Residents are intimately tied to their homes, and a dramatic and public search functions as an 
official accusation of criminal conduct that affords residents no anonymity. The stigma flowing 
from the event will linger with the home and attach to the resident, regardless of guilt. Because 
of the lasting impact, the Fourth Amendment should remain in place as a barrier against arbitrary 
invasions of the home unsupported by probable cause. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (“The basic 
purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment... is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”). As the Supreme Court of Florida noted, 
“[s]uch a public spectacle unfolding in a residential neighborhood will invariably entail a degree 
of public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment for the resident, whether or not he or she 
is present at the time of the search.” Jardines, 73 So.3d at 48. Therefore, it is only appropriate 
to subject residents to an embarrassing and public search of the home when probable cause is 
shown or an overwhelming justification for the search exists. Here, neither condition was 
satisfied.
The search of Mr. Jardines’s home was highly invasive because it involved a physical 




2. There is a heightened expectation of privacy in the home rendering a 
search of the home more invasive.
This Court has upheld sniff searches initiated on less than probable cause only two times, 
both in narrowly drawn holdings that are distinguishable from the facts here because the searches 
occurred away from the home. See Place, 462 U.S. at 699 (search of luggage in airport); 
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406 (car on highway). In both Place and Caballes, this Court balanced the 
justification for an unwarranted sniff search against the relative intrusion on the individual.
Place, 462 U.S. at 704; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-09. In considering the intrusion, this Court 
analyzed the physical invasion and potential for embarrassment in the context of the search 
location. Place, 462 U.S. at 707; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. In locations where the privacy 
expectation is high, like a private home, the relative intrusion is more egregious.
In Place, DBA agents in a New York airport seized Place’s luggage and administered a 
canine sniff search based on suspicions that he was transporting narcotics. 462 U.S. at 699. The 
canine alerted positively to the presence of narcotics, and the agents obtained a search warrant to 
open the luggage. Id. At trial. Place moved to suppress all evidence gathered pursuant to the 
warrant alleging the sniff search occurred in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. This 
Court suppressed the evidence, but also found the sniff search legitimate under the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 707-11. In so ruling, this Court weighed the “nature and extent of the 
intrusion” against Place’s privacy interests. Id. at 704. This Court granted substantial weight to 
the location of the events, highlighting the “transient nature” of airports and noting the seized 
luggage “was located in a public place.'' Id. at 704, 707 (emphasis added). As such, location 
played a key role in determining Place’s privacy interests. Id; see also United States v. Epperson, 
454 F.2d 769, 770-72 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding government interest in detecting metal places a 




501 (2d Cir. 1974) (same); Robert C. Power, Changing Expectations of Privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment, 16 Widener L.J. 43, 56 (2006) (“Airports are now an obstacle course of 
magnetometers, hand-held metal detecting wands, X-ray machines, explosives-sniffing dogs, and 
more.”).
In Caballes, this Court revisited the issue from Place but in the context of a lawftjl 
vehicle stop on an interstate highway. 543 U.S. at 406. Caballes was pulled over on the 
highway for speeding and briefly detained. Id. A second officer accompanied by a drug 
detection canine arrived on the scene and performed a sniff search of the vehicle’s exterior. Id. 
The canine alerted positively to the presence of contraband, and marijuana was found in the 
trunk. Id. Caballes moved to suppress, and this Court ruled that sniff searches initiated on less 
than probable cause are reasonable in the narrowly defined context of “a legitimate traffic stop.” 
Id. at 407. This Court acknowledged that some “intrusion on respondent’s privacy expectations” 
occurred, but noted that in the context of a vehicle, the intrusion “[did] not rise to the level of a 
constitutionally cognizable infringement.” Id. at 409. This Court’s reasoning was consistent 
with prior jurisprudence recognizing a reduced expectation of privacy within a vehicle. See 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The 
search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment 
than the search of one's person or of a building.”); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) 
(“One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation 
and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects.”).
Here, the sniff search is distinct from this Court’s prior holdings because Mr. Jardines is 
entitled to a substantially stronger expectation of privacy at his home. Not only did Place and 




of transit. This Court has consistently recognized an enhanced expectation of privacy within the 
home. See, e.g.^ Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (noting the “centuries-old principles 
of respect for the privacy of the home” are embraced by the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo, 533 U.S. 
at 34 (stating the heightened expectation of privacy within the home has “roots deep in the 
common law”). In addition, under Katz, an individuaFs “manifested [] subjective expectation of 
privacy in the object of the challenged search” serves to strengthen the privacy expectation 
recognized by this Court. Ciraolo, 476 U.S at 211. Mr. Jardines’s front door and windows were 
closed and the shades were drawn. (J.A. 8-9.) Considering the search was initiated at 7:15 am, 
closed doors and windows are not unusual and indicate to a reasonable observer that the resident 
is probably sleeping and would prefer to remain undisturbed. (J.A, 32.) The record is silent as to 
the presence of a gate or fence, and although a barrier might lead this Court to afford Mr.
Jardines greater protection, freedom from physical intrusion has not been preconditioned on such 
construction. See Diinn, 480 U.S. at 301 (building a fence is only one factor that might 
demonstrate the outer boundaries of one’s intimate space); see also Horton, 541 A.2d at 608-09 
(finding “the absence of a fence or other means of excluding passersby from the area may be less 
significant” to the Dttnn analysis in an urban area). Because Mr. Jardines manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy within his home, and because this Court recognizes a 
heightened privacy expectation as inherent to the home, the invasiveness of the sniff search is 
increased. Therefore, the sniff search of Mr. Jardines’s home was substantially more intrusive 
than the sniff searches in Place and Caballes, and this Court should distinguish it accordingly.
Considering the physically intrusive and dramatic nature of the search, as well as the 
substantial constitutional protections afforded to the home, the sniff search can only be described 




area resulting in a dramatic and embarrassing scene in front of Mr. Jardines’s home. The home 
is accorded a heightened degree of protection under the Fourth Amendment, and the curtilage is 
considered part of the home. Further, Mr. Jardines took reasonable and unmistakable steps to 
manifest a subjective expectation of privacy. A physical and public intrusion upon a substantial 
privacy expectation is unlawful unless supported by probable cause or an overwhelming 
government justification.
B. The Sniff Search of Mr. Jardines's Home was Not Justified by a Compelling
Government Interest.
The search of Mr. Jardines’s home was not supported by a compelling government 
interest sufficient to justify a deviation from the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard. 
As noted above, this Court has selectively reduced the evidentiary showing required to initiate a 
search when the government provides sufficient justification for the deviation. See Terry, 392 
U.S. at 30 (holding that an imminent threat to police officers and public safety justifies a limited 
warrantless search). However, in this case, there was no immediate concern for police officer or 
public safety. Further, there was no immediate need to preserve evidence at risk of being 
destroyed, and there was no “special need” stemming from governmental regulation of the 
neighborhood. Considering the lack of justification, probable cause was the proper evidentiary 
showing required to initiate the search.
1. The sniff search was not justified by a concern for the immediate safety of
police officers or the general republic.
The Supreme Court of Florida correctly recognized that a reasonable suspicion standard 
justified under a Terry analysis is inapplicable to the sniff search of a home. Jardines, 73 So.3d 
at 53 (citing Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 
2.2(g), at 540-41 (4th ed. 2004) (noting Terry only supports a limited search for weapons). As 
noted above, this Court in Terry authorized police officers to conduct a limited pat down search
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e for weapons based on “reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity was afoot. Terry, 392 U.S. at 
30. In addition to considering the intrusiveness of the search, this Court weighed the 
government’s justification for deviating from a probable cause standard, hi. at 24. This Court 
highlighted “the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective 
victims” when a suspect is believed to be “armed” and at “close range.” Id. This Court focused 
its analysis on the immediate threat confronted by police officers, and limited the application of a 
reasonable suspicion standard accordingly. Id. at 29-30 (“The sole justification of the search in 
the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must 
therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, 
clubs, or other hidden instruments .. ..”). U is tempting to carry this Court’s Terry analysis into 
other contexts, but subsequent opinions have confirmed Terry>'s narrow application. See, e.g., 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) (“Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow ... 
any search whatever for anything but weapons.”); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 
(1979) (finding Terry applies “only for the purpose of a pat-down for weapons”).
Here, there was no immediate danger to police officers or the public that would justify 
the initiation of a search based on less than probable cause. Terry was concerned with suspects 
who were armed, dangerous, and standing at close range. 392 U.S. at 24. In contrast, there were 
no visible suspects at Mr. Jardines’s home, and the search was initiated in an effort to locate 
diugs. (J.A. 8-9.) The officers arrived in the early morning and found no car in the driveway, 
the front door closed, and the shades on the windows drawn. (J.A. 8-9.) The only sign of Mr. 
Jardines’s presence was a humming air conditioner, and the detectives did not make note of the 
air conditioner until after the sniff search was complete. (J.A. 37.) Moreover, Detective Pedraja 
testified that typically “[tjhere is no [human] traffic” at hydroponics labs. (J.A. 44.) Marijuana
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growers “don’t want to be seen by neighbors, they don’t want to associate with neighbors” and 
“[t]hey are not selling or buying from the residence ” (J.A. 44.) Therefore, Detective Pedraja 
anticipated a quiet scene and observed nothing upon arrival that could reasonably indicate 
immediate danger. Detective Pedraja did receive an anonymous tip reporting the grow operation, 
but the tip was over a month old by the day of the search. (J.A. 8.) Moreover, this Court has 
held that uncorroborated anonymous tips are insufficient to establish probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,272-73 (2000). Because Mr. Jardines’s 
home posed no immediate threat to officers or the surrounding neighborhood, the Terry 
reasonable suspicion standard is inapplicable.
2. The sniff search was not justified by exigent circumstances creating an
immediate need for the search.
The presence of exigent circumstances creating an immediate need did not justify the 
warrantless sniff search of Mr. Jardines’s home. In exceptional cases, this Court has allowed 
warrantless searches of homes when “exigent circumstances” create an immediate need for law 
enforcement to take action and conduct a search. Vale v. Louisiana^ 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970). 
In Vale, this Court set forth three categories of exigent circumstances that provide justification 
for a warrantless search: (1) officers are responding to an emergency, (2) officers are in hot 
pursuit of a fleeing felon, and (3) officers are preventing the immediate destruction of removal of 
evidence. Id. at 35. In each scenario, this Court has recognized that timing constraints may 
prohibit an officer from following normal protocol, justifying a warrantless privacy invasion.
See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (“A burning building clearly presents an 
exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry reasonable.”) (internal quotations 
omitted); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973) (“Where there are exigent 
circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of
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the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.”); Warden, Md. 
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (finding that it was “imperative” for police to 
conduct a search of a home upon pursuing a fleeing felon onto the premises).
Here, it is clear that no exigent circumstances existed. Further, it is inappropriate to 
analogize the exigent circumstance doctrine because there was no immediate concern at the 
scene sufficient to justify a reduced evidentiary standard. The officers did not confront an 
emergency upon arriving at Mr. Jardines’s home. In fact, they encountered the opposite: a 
peaceful scene with no sign of activity or cause for immediate concern. (J.A. 8.) The officers 
were not in hot pursuit of Mr. Jardines or another suspect, and they had no reason to believe 
evidence was being destroyed or removed from the home. The lack ot a “now or never” sense of 
urgency is further evidenced by the government’s month long delay in acting on the anonymous 
tip. (J.A. 8.) Had a sense of urgency been present, it is likely that the government would have 
acted much sooner. No exigent circumstance existed as this Court has previously defined the 
exception, and further, there was no immediate concern that would justify a warrantless search.
3. The sniff search was not justified under the special needs doctrine.
There was no special government need beyond the need for normal law enforcement that 
justified initiating a warrantless the sniff search of Mr. Jardines’s home. This Court has carved 
out a “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement in the civil context. In Skinner v. 
Executives, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989), this Court upheld drug testing of railroad employees based 
on government regulation of the railroads and a concern for public safety. In Vernonia Sch. Dist. 
47Jv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995), this Court validated a wairantlcss search of a student 
by a school principle because of concerns for safety in schools. In both cases, this Court found 
“exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” T.L.O., 489 U.S. at 351 
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
Here, the circumstances justifying the special needs doctrine are not present. In special 
needs cases, this Court found a compelling interest to initiate a search outside the scope of 
criminal investigation. There was no special need or compelling government interest justifying 
the search of Mr. Jardines’s home. The government does not regulate marijuana growing in 
Florida, and the residence was not publicly owned housing. As a result, standard criminal 
procedure should apply to the search of Mr. Jardines’s home, and probable cause is the 
appropriate evidentiary standard.
C. Because the Lawfully Obtained Evidence was Insufficient to Establish Probable 
Cause for the Search Warrant, all Evidence Gathered Pursuant to the Warrant 
Should be Suppressed.
The sniff search of Mr. Jardines’s home was illegal, and “[i]t is axiomatic that evidence 
resulting from an illegal search cannot be the basis of probable cause supporting a subsequent 
search warrant.” State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175, 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 2006); see also 
State V. Morseman, 394 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla. 1981) (holding that illegally gathered evidence 
cannot support the issuance of a search warrant). In Rabb, the District Court of Appeal for the 
Fourth District of Florida ruled to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to a search warrant based 
in part on an illegal sniff search. 920 So.2d at 1188. The court made three key findings that led 
to the suppression ruling. First, the court found that the warrantless sniff search of Rabb’s home 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights and was therefore illegal. Id. at 1184. Second, the court 
found that the officer’s detection of marijuana odor after the illegal canine alert was inadmissible 
because of the high probability that the officer was influenced by the canine alert. Id. at 1191. 
And third, the court considered whether the remaining “independent and lawfully obtained 






concluded that an unsupported anonymous tip, lawfully possessed books and videos about 
cultivating marijuana, and a small amount of marijuana consistent with personal use did not 
establish probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant to search Rabb’s home. Rabb, 920 
So.2d at 1188. Because the warrant was issued in error, all evidence gathered pursuant to the 
execution of the warrant was suppressed.
It should be noted that this Court has established exceptions to the exclusionary rule 
including the good faith exception set forth in Oavw V. C/.S., 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011). In, 
Davis, this Court held that “objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent” 
precludes the exclusion of evidence even if a search is found to be illegal. Id. This Court noted 
that it is “one thing for the criminal to go free because the constable has blundered,” and “quite 
another to set the criminal free because the constable has scrupulously adhered to governing law.” 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Key to the application of Davis is the government’s reliance on 
good law at the time a search is initiated or a warrant is issued. Id. at 2428.
Here, the Supreme Court of Florida correctly ruled to exclude the canine alert and 
subsequent odor detection by Detective Pedraja and correctly found the remaining evidence 
insufficient to support the warrant. Jardines, 73 So.3d at 55. Like in Rabb, Detective Pedraja 
smelled the marijuana after he was made aware of the canine’s positive alert; and moreover, 
Detective Bartelt approached the door first and detected only the scent of mothballs. (J.A. 53,
55, 59.) The remaining evidence consisted of nothing more than a month old anonymous tip and 
the fact that blinds were drawn and an air conditioner was running continuously for 15 minutes. 
(J.A. 8-9.) In Rabb, the court restatea this Court’s holding from J.L that an uncorroborated 
anonymous tip is insufficient to establish probable cause. 920 So.2d at 1187. The remaining 
evidence here was less probative than the lawfully obtained evidence in Rabb, and the court in
35
Rabb held that probable cause was not established. Therefore, the lawfully obtained evidence 
was insufficient to support the issuance of a warrant to search Mr. Jardines’s home, and all 
evidence gathered pursuant to the execution of the search warrant was correctly excluded.
In addition, the Davis good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable 
because Rabb was decided nine months prior to the sniff search at Mr. Jardines’s home. 920 
So.2d at 1175. Established Florida law prohibited the government from sniff searching Mr. 
Jardines’s home without a warrant and prohibited the issuance of a warrant based on evidence 
gathered during a warrantless sniff search. Id. at 1188. Therefore, it was not objectively 
reasonable for Detective Bartelt and Detective Pedraja to believe they were acting in accordance 
with Florida law, and it was not objectively reasonable for a Florida magistrate to believe that the 
warrantless sniff search of a home was lawful evidence that could support the issuance of a 
search warrant. Because the state could not have been acting in good faith, all evidence gathered 
pursuant to the execution of the search warrant at Mr. Jardines’s home should be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida correctly found that the canine sniff of Mr. Jardines home 
was a search under the Fourth Amendment, requiring an evidentiary showing of probable cause 
to initiate. The physical invasion of Mr. Jardines’s constitutionally protected porch by the 
narcotics canine to obtain information was a search under both the Jones Trespass Test and the 
Katz two-pronged test. Mr. Jardines’s expectation that the smells within his home will remain 
private is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Further, initiation of the search 
required a showing of probable cause because the search intrusively invaded a substantial 
privacy expectation and was not justified by special circumstances. Because the government did 
not establish probable cause, the sniff search was illegal and cannot support the issuance of a
warrant. The remaining lawfully gathered evidence was insufficient to support the issuance of a 
warrant, and all evidence gathered pursuant to the warrant should be suppressed. This Court 
should AFFIRM the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida.
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